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CHAPTER 4
The European Institutions and Their
Communication Deficits
Marinella Belluati
The European Union is experiencing a moment of profound crisis, one of
the many since it was founded. Internally, the rise of populism is calling
the pillars of the common project into question; externally, the new fronts
that have opened up with the geopolitical and socio-economic crisis of
2008 and the migrant crisis of 2015 are putting the European institu-
tions’ ability to cope with the major issues of globalization to the test.
After a period flush with such major achievements as the creation of the
Eurozone (with its 19 countries and approximately 350 million inhab-
itants), the Schengen Area and the enlargement to 28 member states,
the approval of the Lisbon Treaty (the EU’s first Constitution) and the
creation of the European Central Bank, the process of integration has
begun to show unmistakable signs of strain. Though there can be no
doubt that these achievements have made the European project more
concrete—fuelling the expectations as well as the criticisms surrounding
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it—repeated onslaughts such as the 2008 financial meltdown, interna-
tional terrorism and the recent migrant emergencies have probed the
limits of what Europe’s institutions can take. Most recently, the threats
besetting the Union have come to a head with Brexit, throwing the
ongoing crisis into even sharper relief.
Democratic Deficit and Political
Deficit: A Gap to Be Bridged
Now that internal and external crises are accentuating the differences
between Member States rather than reducing them, the differentiation
within the EU that has been taken as the narrative of European inte-
gration is becoming a limitation. The backdrop here is the democratic
deficit1 from which the European project suffers, and the long-standing
difficulty in reducing it (Majone 1998; Moravcsik 2002; Follesdal and
Hix 2005). As long as membership of the Union was more symbolic
than tangible, the problems did not surface. But when Europe’s role
in the public and political spheres became more concrete and impacted
the Member States’ domestic politics and the lives of their citizens in
more obvious ways, criticisms and unfavourable views also began to carry
greater weight. The years of permissive consensus (Brechon et al. 1995)
gave way to those of constraining dissensus (Hooghe and Marks 2009),
which is now hardening into open conflict.
The lack of solid institutional narratives addressed to public opinion at
such critical moments as the entry into force of the Schengen (1990)
and Maastricht (1992) treaties, the introduction of the euro and the
enlargement to EU-28 gave free rein to adverse rhetoric in the polit-
ical discourse (Belluati and Serricchio 2014; Belluati and Caraffini 2015;
Belluati 2018). From a certain point onwards, Euroscepticism—or anti-
European populism—became powerful political rhetorics but also an
element of contentious politics as defined by Tilly and Tarrow (2006).
1 ‘The “democratic deficit” is a term used by people who argue that the EU institutions
and their decision-making processes suffer from a lack of democracy and seem inaccessible
to the ordinary citizen due to their complexity. The real EU democratic deficit seems to
be the absence of European politics. EU voters do not feel that they have an effective
way to reject a “government” they do not like, and to change, in some ways, the course
of politics and policy’. Source: Euro-Lex (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html; last
accessed 12 February 2020).
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After the Lisbon Treaty became law, the burden of supporting the Euro-
pean Union’s new arrangements fell largely to the European institutions,
which were unable or unwilling to advance a true political discourse. What
emerged was not just a democratic deficit, which would in any case be
typical of any constituent phase, but a full-scale political deficit (Schmidt
2006) in negotiating and addressing the integration process in the Euro-
pean public sphere. The result was an erosion of trust in the European
Union, at least until 2014. In that year, the trend was reversed, and trust
in the EU outstripped trust in national parliaments and governments.2
Thus began the debate on what the European public space should in
fact be, and what concrete shape a political discourse capable of going
beyond the Member States’ borders should take. It is a widespread
opinion that the creation of a transnational democracy without a Euro-
pean demos (Schlesinger 1995, 1999; Bellamy and Castiglione 2003;
Habermas 2004, 2011; Sassatelli 2008; Risse 2014) is the main reason
that the integration project has stalled (Habermas 2011, 2019). Many
intellectuals have viewed the European project as a challenge to modernity
and the construction of complex identities (Elster 1991; Melucci 1991),
while others have warned of the dangers of forced uniformity and the loss
of values.
There is broad agreement that the reason for the integration project’s
lack of success lies in its democratic deficit, a term first used in 1977, when
it appeared in the ‘Manifesto of Young European Federalists’ by Richard
Corbett (2016). According to Gianfranco Pasquino (2018), applying this
expression to the European Union is as convincing as it is unclear. In
general, it denotes the legitimacy shortfall and inefficiency of the main
European institutions, which are accused of not reflecting the wishes of
the Member States’ voters and being unable to ensure that Europe’s
citizens can fully hold them to account. Thus, all institutional decisions
remain in the hands of the national governments on the one hand and EU
technocrats on the other, cutting the voters out of the picture. Conse-
quently, the decision-making procedures are wide open to the concerns
of Member State governments and the Eurocrats, but not those of the
public. Pasquino (2012) argues that we must determine where exactly
this deficit lies. If the European institutions do not respond adequately
to the voters because the latter do not have the opportunity to express
2Standard Eurobarometer 91, Spring 2019.
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their wishes, then the deficit is a question of what has been called input-
legitimation. Conversely, if the problem is that the institutions act in their
own interests and not those of the ‘people’, then the deficit is one of
output–legitimation.
When we speak of the democratic deficit, however, what do we mean
by the term ‘democratic’? The term refers both ‘to the electoral proce-
dures whereby political office and power are granted to those who
are legitimized to make binding decisions for a community’ and to
the decision-making processes for the elected office-holders. In addi-
tion, it ‘should also include the existence of procedures, methods and
relationships of accountability—or in other words, the decision-makers’
acceptance of their responsibility to the voters who elected them and
who are affected by the decisions’ consequences—and whether or not
voters are in fact able to replace the decision-makers’ (Pasquino 2012:
417–419).
Europe’s democratic deficit has been expressed in many ways. The
intransigent positions that a number of Member States took via the
European Council at several crucial moments resulted in certain political
strategies that were poorly explained and poorly understood by the public,
who thus had an unfiltered view only of the negative consequences. These
States’ economic policies, for example, aggravated the divisions within
the Union, fuelling ‘sovereigntist’ movements and empowering hostile
alliances such as the so-called Visegrád Pact between Poland, Hungary,
the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which is also being eyed by several
Italian and Austrian party groups. The EU’s cohesion and redistribu-
tion policies have had little impact, while the power disparity between
the Union’s ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ countries has become glaringly apparent,
as has the resurgence of ‘sovereigntist’ pressures. And with Brexit, the
culminating moment of the current crisis, the idea of a two-speed Europe
has returned with a vengeance to the institutional and intellectual debate3
on the Union’s future (Cavalli and Martinelli 2015).
From the institutional standpoint, one of the features of the democratic
deficit is the weakness of the European Parliament, the Union’s political
arm and its only institution elected by direct universal suffrage. As the EU
arose primarily as a problem-solving entity, it has long embraced an inter-
governmental working method that thought of the integration process in
3Cfr. online article ‘Europa a due velocità’, https://www.rivistailmulino.it/news/new
sitem/index/Item/News:NEWS _ITEM:4268; last accessed 10 February 2020.
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terms of achieving a strategic compromise between the Member States,
each of which pursued its own interests (Moravcsik 2002). For many
years, this meant that the community institutions—regarded as being at
the service of the national governments—had little autonomy. Since the
late 1980s, the effects of globalization have forced the European insti-
tutions to find a new approach to making decisions, based to a large
extent on neo-institutionalism (March and Olsen 1992) and cooperation
between the Member States. The aim was to promote a principle of social
equity that would make it possible to go beyond national interests, but
these hopes were soon dashed by the difficulty of curbing the many forms
of competition between the Member States and of managing conflict in
the EU’s institutional space.
Though the Lisbon Treaty increased the power of the European Parlia-
ment, which in theory dictates Union policy, its role is still subordinate
to that of the European Commission and Council. Decisions regarding
a variety of questions are subject to the ordinary legislative procedure,
based on what is intended to be an equitable ‘institutional triangula-
tion’. Under the ordinary legislative procedure (also called the co-decision
procedure), proposals by the Commission must be approved by the Euro-
pean Parliament and ratified by the Council, where voting is almost
always unanimous and any Member State can veto the decision. In some
matters such as foreign policy and defence, the European institutions
are not directly involved because the Member States have not ceded
sovereignty. In these cases, decisions on proposals by the Commission
are made through an intergovernmental method where the Council plays
a fundamental part and the European Parliament acts in an advisory
capacity.
The workings of the European parties also contribute to creating a
democratic short circuit (Cavalli and Martinelli 2015). The Europarties’
power to influence policy-making is very different from that tradition-
ally wielded by their national counterparts (Hix 2002; Caraffini 2015).
Taking the operation of Italy’s parties as a comparator, it is clear that
the Europarties’ function is chiefly one of providing links rather than
political guidance. The European party families subscribe to several over-
arching political visions—socialist, popular, liberal, leftist, Christian and
green—but internally, each accommodates national political cultures that
can differ widely (Ciancio 2007; Levi and Sozzi 2015).
Starting from the left-leaning European parties, we have the
Greens/European Free Alliance, where hard-core eco-warriors like the
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Portuguese party share political space with other more institutional and
government-aligned groups such as those from Northern Europe. The
European left has joined forces in the European United Left/Nordic
Green Left (GUE/NGL), where Spain’s opposition Podemos and
Izquierda Unida (IU) have thrown in their lot with Ireland’s Sinn Féin
and the Greek left-wing coalition SYRIZA. Italy’s left-wing Liberi e
Uguali (LeU) party would also have been part of the bloc, had it been
able to send at least one MEP to the European parliament.
Likewise, the European socialists in the European Parliament—the
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D)—are also an
assemblage of parties with highly dissimilar political orientations. To
cite a single example, it is only since 2014 that all of the MEPs from
Italy’s Partito Democratico (PD)—which was established in 2007—have
belonged to the group. Before 2014, only those PD MEPs who had
formerly been with the Democratici di Sinistra (DS) were part of the
group, while those who had been members of the Partito Popolare Ital-
iano (PPI) caucused with the European People’s Party (EPP). The EPP
in turn brought together members of very different national parties,
such as Angela Merkel’s Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU), Silvio
Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (FI) and Victor Orban’s Kereszténydemokrata
Néppárt, or Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP).
The rise of nationalist parties is another example of the atypical oper-
ation of Europe’s supranational political institutions. The liberal Renew
Europe group (RE) is perhaps the most transnational of all, as it is made
up of a series of minor national parties that were able to make their polit-
ical strength felt only on the larger European stage. Had Emma Bonino’s
+Europa reached the threshold required for representation in the Euro-
pean Parliament, it would also have become part of the RE Spitzenteam.
Over time, RE’s charismatic leader, Guy Verhofstadt, has been able to
consolidate a political force which is less constrained by national consid-
erations, though his leadership has recently been challenged by the entry
of the French Liste Renaissance movement headed by Emmanuel Macron.
As for the anti-European parties (something of a contradiction in terms
in the European Parliament), it cannot be said that there is a united
Eurosceptic front. France’s Rassemblement National (RN) headed by
Marin Le Pen and Italy’s Lega Nord (Northern League) under Matteo
Salvini are both in the Identity and Democracy group. Italy’s Movimento
Cinque Stelle (M5s), along with the Basque separatists, are not currently
part of a political grouping, whereas in the previous legislature they were
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together with the UK’s UKIP, which after Brexit is no longer in the Euro-
pean Parliament. Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia (FdI) belongs to the
European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group which also includes
many MEPs from Visegrád Pact countries, though they tend to take their
cue from Victor Orban (EPP).
This tangle of political affiliations produces variable results at the co-
decision stage. It is by no means to be taken for granted that MEPs
will toe their European group’s line. Analyses of parliamentary voting
yield results that are not always unequivocal. The ‘matching rates’ in
votes cast for or against individual measures published by Vote Watch
for Europe4 up to the latest legislature show that how MEPs vote does
not always reflect their national party’s group membership. For example,
the M5s voted together with ALDE, the Greens/EFA and GUE/NGL
much more frequently than with its own group.5
Seen through the lens of national political cultures, the European polit-
ical space thus takes on the blurred outlines of a Politics without Polity
(Dosenrode 2016), validating the charge that the European public space
is too normative. At the same time, beneath the complexity of Europe’s
political architecture, we can discern a new and more transnational poten-
tial, doubtless still highly technocratic, but ready and waiting to express
itself. If we look, for example, at the formation of the parliamentary
majority in Brussels, we see a distinct shift from the political centre that
will have repercussions for future decisions. The grand coalition between
the EPP and S&D that kept a tight grip on the majority in the European
Parliament until 2014 has been forced to bring other groups on board.
The liberal bloc (ALDE, now renamed Renew Europe) has often been the
third force in Parliament. However, the recent success of Green parties in
many European countries except Italy has opened up new possibilities
for forming a majority. Nor should we forget that it is precisely through
alliances that do not hinge on ideology that the European Union has
been able to take major decisions that have often put it in the forefront
in many areas: the environment, health and food safety, human rights,
international cooperation and cybersecurity. Viewed from a pro-Union
perspective, these are all signs of political and institutional action that
4See https://www.votewatch.eu/; last accessed 10 February 2020.
5See https://blog.openpolis.it/2017/01/10/con-chi-vota-piu-spesso-il-movimento-cin
que-stelle-in-europa/13098; last accessed 10 February 2020.
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is anything but static and depoliticized, and whose narrative potential is
high. Nevertheless, this potential has not been put to full, effective use by
the institutions, and information flows have centred mostly on the issues
at stake for the Member States.
The lacklustre outcome of the Union’s new constituent phase and the
distortions generated by the economic crisis seem to have dragged the
European project back to the starting line. If we take a dispassionate
view of how institutional resources are managed, it is clear that there
is an increasing need for a co-decision method where political medi-
ation is central to dealing with the conflicts between Member States.
The crux here is that conflict must be accepted as a ‘natural fact’ that
can never be entirely suppressed in the system of institutional relation-
ships (Adler 1992; Tilly 1984), which also involves NGOs, multinationals,
public opinion and collective movements. Not all of the Member States,
however, have taken the change in the decision-making model to heart.
Those that have—Germany, for instance—have seized the helm of the
EU. Others, like the United Kingdom, have refused to stay the course,
exiting from the European regulation space. Others again have taken
various tacks, often oscillating between these two opposing poles.
At the heart of the democratic deficit that afflicts Europe, then, is the
difficulty of elucidating an institutional and political architecture that is
anything but clear, and is saddled with a set of far-from-straightforward
rules of operation that make it seem remote and difficult to understand.
The lack of politicization of the European public sphere weighs heavily on
the situation, as does the inability to bring effective messages about ethics
and values into the public discourse (Belluati 2012, 2015). Many factors
can be blamed. On the one hand, the Member States balk at pushing their
own interests into the background and making real efforts to pursue a
policy of solidarity; on the other, the European institutional ethos prides
itself on striving to be super partes, which an increasingly polarized and
partisan public arena tends to find alienating.
Though all of these elements can be interpreted in many ways, our
intention here is to discuss them from the perspective of communica-
tion, which encompasses and regulates them all. In any case, the oft-cited
Habermasian notion of the public sphere (Habermas 1990) centres on the
effectiveness of communication processes in activating the institutional
demos. Communication, however, is not only technique and strategy,
but is also identity and active engagement (Koopmans and Erbe 2004;
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Della Porta and Caiani 2006) in an increasingly interconnected and cross-
fertilized communication environment (Bondebjerg and Golding 2004;
Bondebjerg and Madsen 2008; Hutter et al. 2016).
The Information Deficit:
Perennially Playing Catch-Up
Apart from the problem of the decision-making method, the current
phase must get to grips with the fact that, as Vivien Schmidt (2006)
argues, the national polities are political orphans, and most Member States
end up submitting to decisions without championing the need for them.
This inevitably makes it harder to arrive at legitimized decisions. Whereas
the de-politicization of Europe’s institutional space in the first constituent
phase was dictated by caution and by the fear that an overly political
approach would lead to political paralysis or even undermine the fragile
process of integration, the much-touted impartiality and even handed-
ness is now revealing itself to be a limitation that explains the reasons for
the internal crisis. Some scholars have maintained that the fragility of the
Union’s institutions and the growing dissatisfaction with the European
project (and even open hostility towards it) are not so much the result of
the absence of a European demos or of institutional rationality, as of the
lack of political mobilization and discursive access in the public sphere
(Koopmans and Erbe 2004). This lack is the main cause of the widening
gap and growing estrangement between the place where decisions are
made in Europe and the place where these decisions take effect. The
much-discussed democratic deficit that separates the discourses produced
by the European institutions, and the public, is thus the outcome of the
lack of political mobilization at the European level, which has created the
paradox of a supranational dimension that acts and interacts concretely
with no ‘political’ vision to support it. Weighing on this is also the lack of
mediation by the information system, which in the absence of spectacle
surrounding the decision-making process shows little interest in what goes
on in Brussels. With no real engagement on the part of the parties or
interest groups, European decisions have no capacity to set the agenda
unless they become political battlegrounds. The issue of migration is a
clear example. Even though the European institutions have been working
long and hard on a co-decided policy, the urgency of certain events and
the anti-immigration rhetoric make these efforts look entirely unavailing
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and irrelevant, while allowing populist and hostile political forces to domi-
nate the scene.6 The feebleness of European decisions stems precisely
from the fact that the impact of institutional interaction has not yet made
itself felt at the level of public debate.
Against this backdrop, the structure of Europe’s communication in
terms of both organization and the production of social meaning is a
central strategic resource for building a sense of belonging and iden-
tity, and a bureaucratic culture. Despite delays and resistance, the salience
of European issues in the public sphere is increasing (de Vreese 2007).
The Brussels institutions grasped this fact before grasping the political
dimension and have long invested in communication policies to support
their actions (D’Ambrosi 2019). This process is the exact opposite of
the traditional consensus-building practices deployed in mature democ-
racies, where the communication resource is usually managed by political
groups, parties or other stakeholders who, more or less in line with the
media system (Hallin and Mancini 2004), construct the narrative space for
issues at the national and European levels. The institutions are involved
in these flows only afterwards, when decisions are translated into poli-
cies (Bobbio and Roncarolo 2016), following a familiar issue-attention
cycle (Downs 1972). In Europe, the communication pipeline is turned
around, as the institutions themselves handle the public narrative about
EU decisions and channel it to the citizenry using their own methods
and forms. At best, the political and media spheres tend to receive this
narrative with a yawn; at worst, they will subscribe to (or at least not
refute) negative counter-narratives. This short circuit acts on the cogni-
tive plane at all levels, dragging Europe, public life and political routines
even farther apart. Speaking of the European communication deficit thus
requires us to take a closer look at the three streams that flow together
to form Europe’s public discourse. The first is the process of constructing
6The third Dublin Resolution for asylum seekers came into force in 2013 after lengthy
negotiations among the Member States. The text approved was of more limited scope
than the one proposed by the European Commission. Although it was signed by all
member states, in 2015, during the migrant crisis, some signatory countries—Hungary,
Poland, Slovenia and the Czech Republic—refused to apply it. Although it was in Italy’s
interest to push the European Council to have the resolution enforced, the former deputy
Prime Minister, Matteo Salvini, of the Lega (League), aligned himself with these countries.
Political populist positions in many states have dominated the institutional agenda.
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European identity, the second concerns the workings of the Union’s insti-
tutions, and the third relates to the information dimension that regulates
the European space (Belluati and Marini 2019).
We can start with the question of identity, as it is a delicate and
controversial issue but one that is crucial if the difficulties of designing
a European demos are to be overcome. There can be little doubt that
the process of recognizing a European identity entails a series of inter-
dependent steps, each of which contributes in its own way to outlining
a space for communicating identity. The early dream of a common
European culture soon proved all too illusory, as the European space
is made up of an array of cultural, religious, geographical and polit-
ical diversities that it would be difficult, and undesirable, to reduce to
uniformity (Norris 1997). So far, the political identity associated with
European citizenship has chiefly been based on technocratic rules (free
circulation and free trade) and on the sum of loosely integrated national
identities (Thiesse 1999). One factor concerns the definition and devel-
opment of a European historical memory, in which the Member States’
investment has always been minimal (Lee and Thomas 2012). Apart
from the rhetoric of Europe as the guarantor of the longest period of
peace, few other narratives have arisen over time. The first moments
of a European collective memory were the fall of the Berlin Wall, the
introduction of the euro and, paradoxically, the financial crisis and the
subsequent austerity policies. What Europe’s cultural identity lacks is
a European cultural heritage, or in other words, that symbolic fabric
whose warp and weft are woven together into a common space. There
are those who maintain that this is an overly essentialist view which
fails to give European countries’ cultural heterogeneity its due (Meinhof
and Triandafyllidou 2006; Sassatelli 2008). Others acknowledge that the
policy of promoting European culture is working, celebrating Europe’s
multiculturalism and the post-modern idea that different identities can
coexist (Verderame 2018). Europe’s cultural policies7 have long subsi-
dized the construction of symbolic transnational and identity resources
through cooperation and exchange programmes, as well exemplified by
Erasmus Plus. More recently, investments in infrastructures and in efforts
7The largest investment is in the EACEA (Education, Audiovisual and Culture
Executive Agency), which manages funding for education, culture, audiovisuals, sport,
citizenship and volunteering. See https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/education-aud
iovisual-and-culture_en.
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to overcome the digital divide have been trying to create transnational
architectures, though they have met with resistance in individual Member
States (Cronin 2002; Dunkerley et al. 2002). Language is another factor
in cultural integration. Dieter Grimm (1995) and Philip Schlesinger
(1995) have drawn attention to the pragmatic obstacles thrown up by
the lack of a common language and shared communication systems.
One side of the debate holds that without these prerequisites, creating
a communicative rationality that can work towards building European
citizenship is inconceivable. It is widely believed, however, that this
is a non-problem: European identity should spring from the interac-
tion of different messages, rather than standardizing forms and codes
of communication. The culturalist vision maintains that language is not
just a system of grammatical rules, but is a social practice that produces
identity. At present, 24 languages are spoken in Europe, and official docu-
ments are translated into all of them—but the cost of this to the Union
is not even particularly daunting. As several scholars have emphasized,
multilingualism is a cultural asset (Gazzola 2006) because it encourages
differentiation and the creation of multiple identities (Melucci 1991), but
also calls for investing in mediation practices.
An identity policy must also be based on an architecture and a gover-
nance that are equally solid. Mention has already been made of the fact
that there is no integrated European media system, and the attempts that
have been made so far at the institutional level, like Euronews—the Euro-
pean news network—or EuTube—the European Commission’s YouTube
channel—and the official accounts on social media are fairly marginal and
have little impact on the public debate (Cornia 2010). For many years, the
Commission’s DG Comm in particular has fielded a permanent communi-
cation organization and policies.8 The DG has its own budget and has had
a number of directives approved over the years that effectively express the
8In 1995, the Santer Commission’s PRINCE programme laid down the first guidelines
for orienting and organizing the Union’s communication flows. These were the first
steps along a route that over the years would create information centres throughout the
EU. The programme was followed in 2001 by the Prodi Commission’s White Paper on
European Governance, which significantly reinforced the communication strategy pursued
by Brussels. Since the early 2000s, there has been a succession of other European policy
measures regarding the forms and instruments of communication, including the 2006
Green Paper on Transparency that sought to intervene in the process of digitization
and move towards open government strategies in public administrations. Most recently,
directives for fighting fake news and misinformation have been approved.
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goals and functions of Europe’s institutional and public communication.
In the last decade, the European Parliament—whose public functions are
more recent—has filled a communication gap by establishing its own DG
Comm, whose structure and investments have continued to grow. The
great anomaly of European communication is that institutional efforts
are making up for the de-politicization of Europe’s public sphere. This
is especially apparent during elections, when the national and European
parties have done almost nothing to win public support for their candi-
dates’ European platforms. This attitude towards Europe on the part of
national politics has spurred the Union’s institutions to assume control
of the electoral narrative, with all the limitations that this entails, and
to take charge of most of the political communication circulating during
campaigns. The 10% increase in voter turnout during the 2019 European
elections was interpreted as being chiefly the result of the European Parlia-
ment’s all-out efforts at mobilization through the ‘This Time I’m Voting’
campaign.9 This was very much a departure for the European commu-
nication system, but a necessary one, as it vested the institution with a
role which, on a democratic stage, would have been filled by other polit-
ical actors. Some contributions to Europe’s institutional communication
are also made by the European Council, the highest level of intergov-
ernmental cooperation between the Member States, and an effectively
political body as it is the forum where the national sovereignties deal
with complex or delicate issues that cannot be resolved elsewhere. This
institution’s communicative function is inversely proportionate to its role,
which has become increasingly central over the years, often acting to block
decisions made by the other European institutions.
Another aspect that is crucial in outlining the European public sphere
is the capacity to frame discourse. The European institutions are accused
of being over-complicated and far removed from everyday life. Politically,
they seem to have gone AWOL. But there is another rightful partici-
pant in the production of Europe’s social content: the media (Belluati
and Marini 2019). For years, studies have blamed the information
deficit on the traditional media outlets, as being ineffective at orienting
public discourse towards European concerns (Grossi 1996; Marletti and
Mouchon 2005). Institutional journalism has shown little desire or ability
9https://www.thistimeimvoting.eu/.
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to shift away from its self-referential focus on national parties and polit-
ical figures. There is a unanimous conviction that mainstream journalism
neither frames European issues appropriately nor covers them in suffi-
cient depth. There is an ambivalence in this debate that is not easy to
resolve (Koopmans and Statham 2010). On the one hand, it is clear
that quality journalism finds it increasing difficult to cover the European
Union’s institutional activities. On the other, the growing international-
ization of information and the new identity bestowed on it by the new
channels of communication have called journalism in general—and Euro-
pean journalism in particular—more openly into question (Kriesi et al.
2008; Koopmans and Statham 2010; Risse 2010; Marini 2014). New
technologies and sources of information are bringing about profound
changes in how information produces social meaning. There is a tension
between being deeply embedded in constant, global information flows
and the need to re-localize experience (Meyrowitz 1985). This tension
is clear in the European information flow, which is changing significantly
as a result of new communicative opportunities that are more indepen-
dent and disintermediated than the traditional journalistic approach. This
explains why the once-familiar Brussels correspondents are disappearing
and the bubble they worked in has burst, but it also explains the presence
of new sources and players in the European information space. Never
before have the flows of European news been so intense and salient. New
organizations and professional skills are taking shape that, niche though
they may be, are redefining what makes European information news-
worthy. At the same time, they are changing the frameworks of meaning
that a given news flow produces. Though the effect is still limited, and
complements rather than replaces existing communication systems, some
reverberations at the level of public narrative are beginning to make
themselves felt.
Conclusions
While the question of Europe’s democratic deficit is deeply entwined
with the theme of communication, it cannot be considered apart from
the political deficit. This chapter has attempted to draw attention to
the fact that the gulf between Europe’s institutions and its citizens will
not be bridged on its own, but calls for an effort to reinstate Europe’s
symbolic and cognitive dimension. Unaware as many public players may
seem to be, the impact and interdependence of European decisions are
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processes that cannot be reversed except with much pain and turmoil,
as the British experience will show. Though Community choices have a
significant influence on public decisions and everyday life, this is some-
thing that national political circles and the more traditional channels
of communication fail to realize, and thus do not problematize with
sufficient attention. But the European public sphere is more crowded
than is generally thought, and new home-grown intermediate bodies are
appearing. In the third sector, there are increasing numbers of transna-
tional actors such as consumer movements, environmental movements
and NGOs. Moreover, new information sources have arisen in the Euro-
pean space (Politico.eu, for example) and are becoming influential in
steering the public debate and raising it to another level. Nor should
we underestimate the role of the European institutions, the only actors
on this scene who are stretching the limits of their functions to help a
Europeanized vision of public discourse gain ground. If a true European
public sphere is to come about, every mechanism must mesh together to
ensure that this is not the ‘last chance’ (Habermas 2019) for Europe’s
‘unfinished adventure’ (Bauman 2006).
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